The purpose of this paper is to interpret an American military media strategy designed for the Iraq war from a perspective drawing on recent theoretical discussions of space and time. The material consists of a short white paper that was declassified under the Freedom of Hence there was a fundamental contradiction between the stated intentions of the network as a provider of balanced news and its broader position within US military objectives. The RRMT plan reveals a series of strategies, inherent conflicts, and assumptions which can be seen to enact forms of symbolic violence complimentary to that of the military. By this, I mean that it sheds light on sophisticated strategies for the 'transposition' of military force to the discursive sphere; for the exertion of violence by other means in US attempts to manage perceptions of the war. In a fundamental sense, the RRMT strategy uses media as an extension of warfare, and this paper will look at how 'actual' violence was transferred from the military battlefield to the discursive.
Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to interpret an American military media strategy designed for the Iraq war from a perspective drawing on recent theoretical discussions of space and time. The material consists of a short white paper (3 pages) and accompanying PowerPoint presentation that were declassified under the Freedom of Information Act and published by the National relations, and branding have heavily influenced public affairs, thus binding its practice to private industries at many levels. Furthermore, its narrow definition as communication with domestic audiences is complicated by global news networks picking up American news stories and vice versa 6 .
Information Operations are military-led exercises with the aim of 'shaping the information space' or 'perception management'. They may include straightforward information campaigns (such as information about landmines), 'psychological operations' (PSYOPs), and propaganda and deception 7 . An example can be seen in the opening phases of Operation Iraqi
Freedom, during which a 'barrage' of broadcast messages, emails, faxes, and cell phone calls were sent to numerous Iraqi leaders urging them to abandon support for Saddam 8 . Estimates
suggest that between 31 and 36 million information leaflets of different kinds were dropped on Iraq by coalition forces during the first phase of the war. Of the 60 different types of leaflets, 40% of the messages urged surrender of troops under threat of violence, and 30% related to civilian protection and information 9 . Since these military communication exercises
were bound to more general military activity, the strategy could be defined as communicative acts by the military backed up by the threat of violence.
Public diplomacy takes influences from public affairs but is government communication aimed directly at foreign publics. This involves a decentring of diplomatic practices from between governments and behind closed doors, to strategic engagement with foreign citizens, and particularly those in positions of influence. often -misleadingly -takes place under the banner of 'public diplomacy'. The RRMT plan sits rather awkwardly at the intersection of IO and public diplomacy activities, representing both part of the war effort and a putative Iraqi public sphere.
Communication issues
Before moving on to an analysis of the RRMT text, it is worth raising three important caveats and further issues relating to these definitions. The first is the role of the state in managing the national brand, and the influence of PR, marketing, and branding strategies on political communication. The second looks at 'spatial anomalies' in the definitions of domestic and foreign publics, and in particular inter-and counter-spatial flows of information. The third 11 Nakamura & Epstein 2007, pp5-12 & 20-21 Taken together, these strategies can be seen as attempts to 'transpose' military force to the communicative sphere, thus binding material violence to the symbolic through the structural linking of military force to different aspects of media industries. It is from this perspective that I shall address and further discuss the RRMT media plan.
The "Rapid Reaction Media Team"

Vision & impact
In January 2003, some two months before the war began, two Department of Defense agencies -one responsible for psychological operations, the other for covertly planning the war -issued a white paper putting forward the idea of a 'Rapid Reaction Media Team' 29 Nye 1990, pp156-158; Jentleson 2007, p265 30 Gopsill, 2004; Wilson 2006, p3; Sharp, 2003; Battle, 2007; van Ham 2003, pp431 & 437; Svet, 2006. Estimates set the death toll of journalists and their support staff at over 100. By this stage however, issues of poor planning and organisation came to a head in a series of strikes and firings (over 5,000 staff were made unemployed), while public perception in Iraq 33 Battle, 2007; U.S. Department of Defense et al, 2003. References to UK staff suggest little more than token inclusion. 34 Lefebvre 1981 Lefebvre /2008 35 Nye, 1990 was that the network was the propaganda wing of the USG. 
